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There has been considerable concern recently regarding the lax oversight over the 
supplier’s supply chain and the consequent poor quality. This is reflected in considerable 
media interest in understanding the reasons behind poor supplier quality. For example, 
the Mattel toy recall, blamed on a Chinese subcontractor for paint contaminated with lead, 
has received considerable media attention. Poor customer service in call centers is 
another oft-cited example of sub-standard quality, in the services context. 
 
Understanding supplier quality is even more pertinent as supply chains decentralize and 
globalize. Several factors affect the quality choice of the supplier – the technology 
available to the supplier, the contract between the supplier and the buyer(s), the 
regulatory environment and the ability or inability to verify quality. In many cases, 
quality standards may be explicitly contacted upon but parties may not meet their 
obligations due to the challenge that supply chain constituents face from managing the 
costs that arise from the above mentioned factors. 
 
To understand these issues, we model a supply chain where the seller and buyer(s) decide 
upon a mutually agreed quality standard. The supplier controls the quality level, perhaps 
only partially, which is discovered by the buyer only after purchase. The buyer can 
enforce the quality standard by taking a costly action. This action could include legal 
redress and arbitration, packaging and returning defective items, contracting a third party 
to document a breach, etc. The model incorporates penalties which require the seller to 
refund the purchase price of the units that are found to be below the quality standard. The 
analysis helps us understand the effect of purchase price and enforcement costs on the 
quality of the suppliers units. The model differentiates between two kinds of 
enforcement: individual enforcement and joint enforcement (“class action”). In individual 
enforcement, each buyer enforces the quality independently, while in joint enforcement, 
if the unit supplied to even one of the buyers is found to be below the quality standard, all 
the buyers benefit. The results obtained from the analysis provide interesting strategic 
insights. 
 
First, the buyer may have an incentive to provide a higher purchase price in order to 
induce the supplier to provide higher quality. If the prevailing market conditions result in 
high purchase prices, a “normal market” scenario might result, with goods of high quality. 
In this case, the buyer is better-off by providing marginally lower purchase price, while 
the seller is better-off by obtaining marginally higher purchase price. On the other hand, 
if the prevailing market conditions result in low purchase prices, a “black market” 
scenario might result, with cheap goods of poor quality. In this case, the buyer is better-
off by providing marginally higher purchase price. Alternately, the seller is better-off by 
obtaining marginally lower price. In either market, higher enforcement costs lead to poor 
quality highlighting the importance of efficient mechanisms for redress. 
 
Second, when there are several buyers, who each interact independently with the seller 
though individual enforcement, sellers target the quality expectations of the “average 
customer”, leaving some buyers with poorer quality than would be the case if other 
buyers were absent, while other buyers are able to free-ride and obtain higher quality. 
Further, a buyer with dominant market share is able to drive the supplier to provide 
higher quality, while if the market is split, with buyers of small market shares, the seller 
is able to provide poor quality. Thus, large buyers are able to drive the supplier towards 
providing high quality through economies of scale in the cost of enforcement. 
 
Finally, in markets where buyers have the ability to enforce a “class action” on the 
supplier through a joint enforcement, quality is high and is driven by the buyer with the 
least enforcement cost. This result underscores the importance of government regulatory 
bodies, non-government organizations and consumer advocacy groups in quality 
improvements. As bodies with considerable knowledge and capital to pursue quality 
failures, they are instrumental in raising public awareness and lowering the costs of 
enforcing a contract. Concurrently, suppliers in such markets should be vigilant against 
quality lapses. 
 
Managing the cost – quality tradeoffs inherent in decentralized supply chains presents 
unique challenges to managers. Instead of a myopic cost-driven focus, firms can 
maximize their profits by considering the cost of poor quality while designing contracts, 
especially in situations where a class action is possible. 
